USSR- China relations in the Cold and post Cold war era by Iliev, Andrej et al.
Vol 22, No. 3;Mar 2015
313 office@multidisciplinarywulfenia.org
USSR-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE COLD AND 
POST COLD WAR ERA 
 
PhD Andrej Iliev 
(Deputy Head of  Social Science Department in Military Academy, 
R. Macedonia, Assistant Professor, Historian), 1000, Skopje, Tel. 00389070330534 
Email: andrej220578@gmail.com 
PhD Elena Ivanova 
(Ministry of Defense in R. Macedonia, Historian), Tel: 00389071603320 
Email: percinkova@yahoo.com 
PhD Drage Petreski 
(Head of  the Logistic Department in Military Academy, R. Macedonia, Associate professor, 
Technical and Logistic Science), Tel: 00389070403401, Email: drage_petreski@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper describes the relations between the USSR and China after the Second World 
War up to the end of the Cold War and to the present day with special emphasis on the future 
implications for the next 5 to 10 years. 
In the second decade of the XXI century Russia and China are both important players in the multi-
polar global order. Together, they dominate the soil across Europe and Asia. Moscow and Beijing 
share the same interests in the position against the dominant influence of the USA and wider in the 
West. Russia is the world's largest manufacturing strength in oil and gas and China is the world's 
largest importer of energy and the fastest growing economy a fact that contributes to the prospects 
that Russia and China could be levelled soon. 
The relations of the USA, as the only world’s superpower, depend directly from the success or 
failure of these relations.    
The future of the Russian and China relations will be focused on energy security sector, mutual 
comprehensive understanding and security cooperation and military modernization of Chinese 
Army.  
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Introduction 
 
 The Prestige acquired by the US and USSR during World War II is certainly undoubted, 
however the unexpected expansion of the Cold War in Asia after 1949 surprised both sides. World 
War II weakened the nationalist government in China but the Chinese people had decided to give 
their trust to the communists. That would be the reason for the victory of Mao Zedong in 1949. It’s 
not surprising that during World War II the US was inclined to the Chinese nationalists (John, 
2003: 95). The Chiang Kai-Sheik was recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of 
China and even the Soviet Union had recognized its legitimacy. Relations became cold, after the 
US began to think that Moscow could expand its influence over China when Mao and his 
followers won the Chinese civil war. It should be noted that Washington encouraged the 
strengthening of the relations between the USSR and China, however the evolution of the relations 
between the two countries at that time heavily depended on the attitudes and views of Joseph 
Vissarionovich Stalin. On the other hand, this is explained by the hope of Stalin that if agreement 
was reached with Chiang Kai-shek it would be possible to avoid disputable issues with the US in 
Southeast Asia. However, it is unusual but actually largely, Soviet’s and USA’s post-war policy 
toward China was similar. USSR and the US perhaps assumed that the nationalists will regain 
control of China; however, they didn’t anticipate that the Communists would be much better than 
the nationalists in gaining the support of the Chinese people. Therefore, President Harry Truman 
after he had started openly supporting the troops of Chiang Kai-Sheik, he ordered the American 
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delegation led by George Marshall to travel to China in order to achieve an agreement between the 
Nationalists and the Communists (John, 2003: 95). It makes sense that these measures were aimed 
to reduce Soviet influence, because Washington feared that it was possible the Chinese 
Communists to act on Soviet orders. Namely, the attempts by the US Marshall Plan weren’t 
successful and the option that the USSR would have problems in controlling communism beyond 
its borders was expected. On the other hand, the US feared that perhaps Stalin would use Chinese 
communism for his advantage. However, it is a matter of fact that the Mao’s movement was firmly 
grounded in the nationalist tradition which despised a foreign influence regardless of which side 
comes. It is indisputable that both the American and the Soviet side started to treat the Chinese 
issue seriously. It is curious that Mao was unwilling to accept subordination, offered to China by 
both sides. However China had no other choice but to lean on one side – meaning the Soviet side. 
 
1. Historical beginning of USSR-China relations 
 
 The proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 will change the attitudes 
and will strengthen Mao’s power. Chinese leadership is directed towards ensuring national 
security, consolidation of government and economic development. The direction of foreign policy 
of China has chosen in order to implement these goals and to create closer relations with the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries against the US and Japan. On the other hand, the defeat 
suffered by Chiang Kai-Sheik will force him to leave China and look for shelter on Formosa 
(Taiwan), where he was protected by the US. Soon after the founding on the People's Republic of 
China, Mao in February 1950, travelled to Moscow to negotiate this led to the Sino- Soviet Treaty 
of Friendship, Alliance and mutual assistance in the period of thirty years (Rajan, 2009: 4). Under 
this agreement, China gave the Soviet Union some rights, such as the use of naval bases in 
exchange for military support, weapons and large amounts of economic and technological support, 
including logistical support (David, 2002: 23).1 China accepted at least initially, the Soviet 
leadership in the communist world and accepted the Soviet Union as a model for development. 
The Soviets were also interested to enhance the friendship with China, because they had a 
common enemy - the US. (Huei, 2003: 81). The new Chinese government was recognized by the 
Soviet Union as an international entity (Mаргарита,2002:58).2 It seems that China's participation 
in the Korean War (1950-1953) relatively strengthened the Sino- Soviet relations to a great extent. 
The Sino-Soviet alliance in the Korean War somehow united Moscow and Beijing and China had 
became more connected and dependent on foreign power than ever previously (Nele, 2014: 13).   
But things changed over time, especially in the second half of the 1950s, when gradually 
limitations in the matters of ideology, security and economic development appeared (Yang, 
2013:2).3 In China there was anxiety caused by the policy by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and 
his aspirations for de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West (Shelli, 2009:38). The 
armament race or the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite from the Earth on October 4, 1957 
confirmed the Mao’s conviction that the world balance was in favor of the communist world or in 
his words, that the east wind was prevailing over the western (Richard, 2007: 23). 
                                                 
1On the other side, Stalin and Mao were afraid of re-strengthening of Japan and increased US military power and believed 
that they need the supervision over South Korea to secure their position in Southeast Asia (David, 2002: 23). 
5
 American policy has refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China and its place in the UN until 1970s was holding 
Taiwan, because of that China would hardly breakthrough its pathway to international recognition. Taiwan was recognized 
as the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese in the United Nations (Mаргарита, 2002: 58). 
6
 Relations between China and the USSR constantly changed. After the death of Stalin, and especially after the decision of 
the XX Congress with beginning of closing to the capitalist countries, the PR of China especially opposed to. There was 
disagreement on the issue of a new outbreak of world war.  USSR considered the possible new world war would be 
destructive for the mankind and therefore in the 60s would advocate a policy of peaceful active coexistence, whereas the 
PR of China, especially Mao Zedong believed that the capitalist system cannot be destroyed without war. China also did 
not gain support from the Soviet Union for making an atomic bomb, then cooling of the relations was accompanied by 
border conflicts etc. (Mаргарита, 2002: 61, 62). 
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 In the field of science, during the 1950s there were very frequent exchanges between 
China and Russia. Many Russian experts and consultants came to China to help do the Chinese 
construction work. At the same time the Chinese government sent young and middle aged 
scientists to Russia for further studies.  
 Which can clearly be seen in the Agreement from 1957 year between China and Russia 
on 122 items for engineering technology. According to the agreement Russia would help China 
with 156 construction projects which created the need of translators. Students graduated from 
Harbin and Dalian Russian Schools were welcomed everywhere, but they still couldn’t meet the 
need. (Xu, 2005:1016,1017). 
             An interesting fact is certainly the strong intention of China to escape the Soviet model of 
economic development, so that in the period 1958 - 1961 China launched a radical politics "the 
Great Leap Forward" which would result in the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from China. Policy 
campaigns advocated such wholesale economic changes as communal organization of rural labour, 
regional self-sufficiencies and dual track (small and large-scale) industrial investment and 
production (Daniel et al, 2005:2). If we analyse farther back all the events we will come to the 
conclusion that the main ideological, military and economic reasons for the Sino-Soviet division in 
fact were almost similar. Chinese leadership can be observed to possess a strong desire to achieve 
the confidence and independence in their actions, which surpassed the benefits that Beijing 
received as a junior associate of Moscow. 
As early of the 1960s, the Sino -Soviet ideological dispute deepened and expanded and widened, 
including territorial issues, as well (Keith, 2003:2).4 The tension in Sino-Soviet relations was 
strengthened with the increase of competition between Beijing and Moscow for the influence in 
the Third World and the international communist movement. China accused the Soviet Union of 
cooperation with imperialism, for example because of the signing of the Treaty banning nuclear 
weapons with the USA in 1963 (Michael, 2010: 8). This is a period when the Communist Party of 
China would end the relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and it wouldn’t 
be restored up to the end of the Cold war. 
                Severe consequences for the Sino- Soviet relations will also occur during the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Dzorde, 1977:12, 13).5 
               The culmination of the Sino- Soviet dispute would be achieved in 1969, when serious 
armed clashes broke out on the island Zhenbao (or Damanskiy) on the north-eastern border, near 
the Chinese coast of Ussuri (Rajan, 2009: 6) . Both sides would be drawn from the brink of war, 
however the tension would calm down later in 1969 when Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai 
would meet with the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin (Alexander, 2013:5). 
                In the 70s, Beijing took on a more moderate direction and began to renew the friendship 
with Washington as a counterweight to the perceived threat from Moscow and as early in 1969, 
the link China - Russia was almost completely broken at the key year of "Cultural Revolution” 
(Dmitri, 2007:76, 77). The Sino-Soviet border talks moved alternately. By the time of Mao's death 
on September 9, 1976, political Sino-Soviet relations had fallen out completely and weren’t 
restored until the mid-1980s, when Moscow would start sending conciliatory messages (Hannah, 
2013: 19). All of this would result in no substantial progress at that time. Officially, the Chinese 
statements were calling for struggle against the domination of the two superpowers, but especially 
against the Soviet Union, which Beijing considered as a perhaps more dangerous source of war 
than the US. 
                                                 
4Territorial border dispute arose when China in 1963 clearly put the issue of territory lost by “unequal treaties" with 
Imperial Russia. Then , the process of Moscow in 1964 with military organizing along the border with China and in 
Mongolia, which continued in the 70's, the bloody armed clashes on the border in 1969 is cause for termination of the 
relationship Moscow -Peking (Keith, 2003: 2). 
5Revolution consisted should cover the whole China. It was proletarian, because it should having to emphasize the class 
character, against those who separated themselves from the people and went down the road of capitalism, cultural since it 
should make changes in the ideological sphere, and revolution, because of the revolutionary way to fight with the class 
enemy . During the revolution the British Embassy was burnt, which frozen relations with the Great Britain and the Red 
Guards blocked the activities of other embassies. Blockade of the Soviet Embassy extremely froze the Soviet - Chinese 
relations ( Маргарита,2002:63). On the other hand, the cultural revolution retouched awareness, professions of people, 
family conditions; revolution with its conception to cover large state moves and his style is pushed in homes etc. A huge 
crowd of people at rallies has hampered the normal state and economic life, opposed to everything old Chinese and 
European etc. (Dorde, 1977: 12, 13). 
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                Until 1978, the Chinese economy was a typical for a communist developing country. In 
that time, the vice-premier Deng Xiaoping launched some profound reforms, in order to modernize 
Chinese economy and society. These reforms were implemented in the following fields of activity: 
agriculture, industry,science and technology, defense, foreign policy. The most important reform 
implemented in the time of this visionary leader was that concerning the direct foreign investments 
in China. Actually, now a days Chinese “economic miracle” is based on this reform (Florin et 
al,2012:336). The Chinese „Economic miracle“quite successfully described Martin Jacques who 
stated that “If the 20th century ended in 1989, the 21st began in 1978” (Jon et al, 2006:1).6 
 In the late 70s, the increased Soviet military presence in East Asia and Soviet agreements 
with Vietnam and Afghanistan increased Chinese awareness of the threat of the Soviet 
surrounding. The thirty- year-old Chinese - Soviet treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual 
assistance, which had been on hold at the end of 1970s was supplemented with a proposal for 
bilateral agreements. However, bilateral talks would be suspended as a result of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Thomas, 2014: 20). 
In the 80s China’s approach to the Soviet Union began to change, albeit gradually in 
accordance with the adoption of the Chinese independent foreign policy and the opening of 
economic policy. Another factor behind the change was the perception that, although the Soviet 
Union posed a threat to China the threat was more long-term than immediate. However, Sino -
Soviet consultations for normalizing the relations were renewed in 1982 and were held twice a 
year, despite the fact that the reason for their delay was the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
(Thomas, 2014: 20). 
Beijing set three main prerequisites for normalizing the relations, which were called 
"three obstacles” that Moscow had to remove: the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet support 
for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the presence of Soviet troops along the Sino - Soviet 
border in Mongolia (Rajan,2009:8). The stance of Moscow regarding this issue was that these 
problems were the third country’s obstacles and that they were unfit for bilateral discussion. 
The changes in the Soviet leadership between 1982 and 1985 opened space for renewed 
diplomacy (Rajan, 2009: 8).7 At this time, the Sino - Soviet relations began to gradually improve 
in several areas: expanded trade, economic and technical exchange started (including renewing of 
projects originally built with Soviet assistance in the 50s), border crossings were opened and 
delegations were regularly exchanging. 
The Soviet position on Sino - Soviet relations showed the greatest flexibility in 1986 with 
the speech of the Secretary General Mikhail S. Gorbachev in July in Vladivostok (Rajan, 2009: 9). 
Gorbachev was the first to seek Détente. (Arkady, 2011: 22).  
Among the Gorbachev’s proposals for the Asia - Pacific region, several were directed at 
China, including the release of partial withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia, the 
renewal of the concession for the border dispute and proposals for agreements on border railway, 
cooperation in the space program and joint development of hydropower plants. 
Ten years later, along the former Soviet border, China has four neighbors and Russia is 
only one of them. The others, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the new Moslem states were 
engaged in a careful balancing act between Russia, China and the West. The Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) were a most useful framework for the dismantlement of the Soviet Union 
which has turned out to be virtually useless as a tool for post-Soviet integration of Mongolia which 
had shaken off Moscow’s tutelage and had for the first time in its recent history, adopted an 
independent foreign policy posture(Dmitri, 2012:2). 
Although these attempts didn’t lead to a quick breakthrough in the Sino - Soviet relations 
at a high level the bilateral consultations were accelerated and the talks regarding the border were 
renewed in 1987. In the late 80s, it seemed unlikely that China and the Soviet Union would renew 
formal alliance but the Sino - Soviet relations were significantly improved compared to the 
previous two decades. By the mid- 1987 it was uncertain whether the incomplete normalization 
would include renewal of the relations between China and the Soviet Communist Party, after 
China established relations with the communist parties of Eastern Europe? On the other hand, 
                                                 
6The Guardian, 25 May 2006. 
7The Chinese delegation attended the funeral of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin 
Chernenko (Rajan, 2009: 8). 
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Gorbachev's foreign policy must be seen against the background of the policies of his 
predecessors. He inherited not only staggering domestic economic and social ills, but also a 
foreign policy that had become increasingly rigid and defensive (Stephen et al, 2008: 4). 
Before the dissolution of the USSR, Gorbachev had improved relations with the PR of 
China, upon the end of the Cold War, reversal occurred in the Chinese - Russian relations. With 
the advent of the new President Boris Yeltsin the relations with the United States and Europe 
started to arrange and balance, while regarding China the relations were promoted and reached the 
achievement of "Strategic partnership" (Nicklas, 2007: 35).8 Yeltsin nicely captured China’s 
position as a leverage point with the West when he said in 1995: “China is a very important state 
for us. It is a neighbor with which we share the longest borders in the world and with which we are 
destined to live and work side by side forever. Russia’s future depends on the success of 
cooperation with China. Relations with China are extremely important to us from the global 
politics perspective as well. We can rest on the Chinese shoulder in ourr elations with the West. In 
that case the West will treat Russia more respectfully”(Andrew, 2007:322). 
The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, visited Moscow in September 1994 that marked the 
first visit of a Chinese President to the Russian capital since 1957 ( Sujit,2013:6).  
Since then, all the Russian presidents would be directed in solving the border dispute with 
China. Russian president Gorbachev signed  the first (border) contract on this issue in May 1991 
the second agreement with President Yeltsin in 1996, followed by the last of Vladimir Putin in 
2004 (Dmitri, 2004: 9). Since 1960s and 1970s the border’s length of around 4259 km of territory 
along the Ussuri Rivers and Ashur was a sore point for both countries (Dmitri, 2001: 211).9 It is 
very important to emphasize that both states had the maps on which different border lines were 
drawn according to the claims of the respective state. Comparison of the two maps showed a 
disputable area of 30 to 40 thousand square kilometers (Yang, 2013: 6). For many Russian 
analysts Chinese hostility has always been a strategic nightmare in which the Soviet Union has 
spent huge amounts in order to strengthen the border with China. 
 
2. Russia-China relations after the Cold war 
 
It is well known that during the historically short 20-year period of contacts between the 
Russian Federation and China have paved a way from “friendly status” (1992) to a relationship of 
“comprehensive equal partnership of trust and strategic cooperation” (2012). For more than a 
decade after the signing the Treaty of Good-Neighborhood, Friendship and Cooperation between 
Russia and China on 16 of July 2011, Moscow and Beijing invariably characterize the state of 
their bilateral relations as the “best in history,” qualifying them as “a relationship of mutual 
support and joint efforts for common prosperity, friendship, transmitted from generation to 
generation” (Vladimir, 2013:235). 
In order to intensify the “strategic partnership” in June 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization was established and in July 2001 the connection is strengthened by the Treaty of 
good neighborly friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and China (Richard, 
2011: 5).10 The agreement was intended to set a foundation for a long-term comprehensive 
development of relations and strategic interaction between Russia and China in the scope of equal 
cooperation and trust based on strategic partnership. In fact, the growing level of strategic 
partnership and increased diversity of its forms and methods secured the overall positive 
background of the Russian- Chinese relations in the first decade of the XXI century (Vladimir, 
2010: 2).11 Both, the Chinese and Russian leaders considered these agreements as political 
                                                 
8The term became with the signing of the Treaty of good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation at a summit in 
Moscow 1997 between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin (Nicklas, 2007: 35). 
9
 Of which the eastern section is 4.204 km long, and the western section one just 55 km. The two sections are separated by 
the territory of Mongolia (Dmitri, 2001:228). 
10Russia,China and 5 state of the Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as the 
permanent members. India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan had the observer status in the organization. (Richard, 2011:5). 
11The survey was conducted by the experts of the Institute for International relations at the International University in 
Beijing, in the survey  of the power of the foreign relations of China in accordance with the quantitative assessment of 
whether they are seen as "enemy" ( -9 to -3 ) " neither hostile nor friendly " ( -3 to 3 ) or "friendly" ( 3 to 9 ), they gave the 
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arrangements that determine the development of Sino - Russian relations in the new century 
(Victor, 2012: 179). By the agreements the relations between the two countries were promoted 
with a much stronger and rapid development. Resolving border issues lingering throughout history 
started to be solved. Both countries provided strong support in the field of sovereignty, security 
and interests’ development, as well as gaining mutual trust. However, China and Russia 
established a solid communication level, by frequently holding mutual visits and meetings. 
After the end of the Cold War, the improved political and economic relations between 
Beijing and Moscow influenced the international security issues. The established Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization from 2001 functioned as the Chinese - Russian condominium, whose 
aim was to maintain security on the territory of Central Asia (Richard, 2008: 65). China and 
Russia expanded their bilateral economic and security cooperation on many global and regional 
issues.12 
In the last decade, China and Russia has paid greater attention to what they call a 
"Strategic partnership”. Moscow and Beijing share the same interest in the position against the 
dominant influence of the US and elsewhere in the West. 
It seems that by signing of the final agreement in 2004 for demarcation of approximately 
4000 km long Sino- Russian border at least on the surface, the largest source of historical mistrust 
between the two countries was removed (Shoich, 2010: 9). During Putin`s visit to China in 
October 14, 2004 the two sides signed the Supplementary Agreement of the People`s Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation on the Eastern part of Sino-Russian Border. Thus, China and 
Russia defined the entire length of the boundary line for the first time in over 300 years of contacts 
(Yang, 2013:15). 
To be more precise, the entire spectrum of Sino-Soviet relations remained unchanged and 
painlessly accepted each presidential transition in Russia. The elasticity is a characteristic to the 
objective interests of Russia and China in the continuation of the mutually favorable cooperation, 
mutual ideological and political Platform (Vladimir,2010:2).13 “The agreement for good 
neighborly relations, friendship and cooperation” of 2001, was more and more applicable in the 
years that followed. It renewed the bilateral cooperation on several levels with new elements on 
new levels, so that it went through a practical interaction with” the Action plan for 2009-2012” in 
order to implement the Russian-Chinese dialogue on energy, which assisted in making new 
agreements for cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas, including the agreements for 
construction of the oil pipeline Skovorodino-Daqing and to provide a loan from the Bank of China 
in the amount of 25 billion dollars for the Russian oil companies “Transneft and 
Rosneft”(Vladimir, 2010:2).14 
The Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean (ESPO) spur pipeline towards China, from 
Skovorodino in Russia to Daqing in China was completed 2010 and use of the pipeline for agreed 
oil delivers began in January 2011 (Shigeki, 2012:76). 
It carries oil from Siberian oil fields to the town of Skovorodino, located in the Amur 
region, still 2,100 kilometers from the Pacific Ocean but 2,750 kilometers closer than was possible 
before. From there it is shipped by rail to Kozmino Bay. This was a major achievement for Russia, 
giving the country a significant opening to the Far East (Andrew, 2010:3). 
                                                                                                                                     
highest rating of 8 points to  the relations China - Russia in early 2008 (compared to 5.5 points in 2000), while the Sino - 
French relations gained 6.3 points, India 5.4 points and the United States 1.1 points (Vladimir, 2010:2). 
12China and Russia in particular became closer when the issue was the rise of Islamic extremism in Central Asia. 
13As the Deputy of Prime Minister Putin, Medvedev in 2006-2007, led Russian efforts during the “Year of Russia" in China 
and the “Year of China" in Russia. In addition, China welcomed the fact that the newly elected Russian president chose 
China for his first visit abroad, outside of the CIS. The significance of Medvedev's visit to China on 23 -24 May 2008, was 
highlighted by the signing of a joint declaration to formulate an agreement on major international issues. This document 
confirms the determination of both countries to civilization and cultural diversity within the world community and the 
creation of a multipolar world. Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao continued the tradition of regular meetings (a few times a 
year ) to exchange views on pressing international and bilateral issues, which was created during the term of President 
Vladimir Putin . In addition , in 2008-2009 the contacts in this format became more intense : in addition to official visits ( 
Hu Jintao's visit to Russia in June 2009 ) and the meetings on the side-lines of the G8 summit, APEC and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization , and had bilateral meetings (Vladimir, 2010 : 2 ) . 
14This credit should be returned with future deliveries of Russian oil to China (300 million tons within 20 years, starting 
from 2011 ). During the 14th regular meeting in October 2009 in Beijing, the prime ministers of the two countries reached 
the Agreement for supplying China with Russian natural gas, starting in the year 2014 to 2015 (up to 70 billion cubic 
meters )Vladimir, 2010: 2. 
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In the investment sphere, bilateral cooperation received additional incentive, because it 
prompted Russian - Chinese cooperation in the field of investment, especially the cooperation with 
regions of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia to China's Northeast for 2009-2018 year, 
including the areas of extraction of resources, manufacturing and construction of transportation 
facilities (Vladimir, 2010: 3). 
The most important projects receiving Chinese investment on Russian territory are the 
Baltic Pearl Real Estate Complex in St. Petersburg, the Greenwood Business Center in Moscow, 
with Chinese investment worth 350 million dollars and the glass production plant for cars in 
Kaluga with 200 million dollars of Chinese investment. At the same time, China is investing in the 
wood industry, cement production, brick, truck and elevator industry, among other branches of the 
Russian economy. The closest cooperation is taking place in the neighboring regions of both 
countries (Tatiana, 2013:15). 
The highlight of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai in May 2014 was 
the signing of a 30-year accord for to supplying China with natural gas through a new pipeline 
from the Russian Far East where China and Russia signed a 30-year gas supply agreement worth 
$400 billion (Iacob, 2014:3). 
The new accord between China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Gazprom 
marked another milestone in Russia’s shift away from Europe and towards Asia. The deal clears 
the way for the development of the Russian Far East’s giant Chayanda natural gas field and the 
completion of a pipeline, called the Power of Siberia which will carry 38 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) of natural gas per year to China starting in 2018. That is the equivalent to more than a 
quarter of Russia’s current natural gas exports to Europe. Russia eventually hopes to boost those 
exports to over 60 bcm per year (Felix, 2014:1). 
What is benefit for both countries is the development of economic cooperation between 
the two countries. China and Russia have made a significant progress regarding this issue, 
especially in the energy sector (Zhao, 2010: 1).15 
In 2009, China and Russia signed a formal agreement to exchange loans for oil (Zhao, 
2010: 1, 2).16In return, Russia repaid the loans by supplying China with 300 million tons of petrol 
an average annual volume is 15 million tons from 2011 to 2030 (Zhao, 2010: 1). To transport this 
oil, some of the loans are used to build a branch pipeline from East Siberia - Pacific Ocean to 
China. The opening of the pipeline Siberia - Pacific on 1-st of January 2011, for China meant 
increasing of the oil supply and for Russia it is extremely important because it opens an additional 
market - entry into the US market for oil (Shoichi, 2010: 10).17 Due to the geographical proximity 
between the two countries is the fact that Russia is the world's largest manufacturing power in oil 
and China is the world's largest importer of energy and fastest growing economy a fact that gives 
the prospects that Russia and China could be leveled soon. 
 
3. The future of Russia-China relations 
 
According to the January 2014 IEA Oil Market Report, as the second largest oil 
consumer in the world after the US, China’s oil demand continued to grow in 2013 at 10.1 mb/d, a 
3% increase over 2012, and it is forecast to reach 10.4 mb/d in 2014 and 10.8 mb/d in 2015. Over 
the longer term, International Energy Agency forecasts suggest that oil demand will reach 12 mb/d 
by 2018 and 15.6 mb/d by 2035. China is expected to overtake the United States as the largest oil 
consumer by around 2030 (Julie et al,2014:10). 
To date, China - Russian energy investment company received 51 percent of the shares in 
the Russian oil and gas "Suntarneftgaz” and received the rights for developing and production of 
two natural gas fields in East Siberia. These Russian - Chinese deals indicate that their cooperation 
in the energetic goes beyond simple sale of oil and relate to cooperation in the exploitation of 
                                                 
15As a result of the global financial crisis, there was a serious decline in the level of the Sino - Russian trade, with bilateral 
trade volume decreased by about 30 percent, but the economic cooperation between the two countries continues to be 
important, and cooperation in the energetic sector is a bright spot in all these years (Zhao, 2010: 1). 
16China has provided a long-term loans of $ 25 billion to Russia , of which $ 15 billion going to the Russian oil company " 
Rosneft " and $ 10 billion to Russian company for transport of oil "Transnet" . The biggest reason for this type of 
cooperation is the impact of the economic crisis on Russia in 2008 (Zhao, 2010:1,2 ) 
17Collaboration is by Rosneft, the only Russian company which produces oil for export in China (Shoichi, 2010: 10). 
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natural gas fields. Cooperation in the field of natural gas also had and still has a great potential. 
After more than five years of negotiations in 2008 Moscow and Beijing reached a framework 
agreement on plans to build in both directions (East and West) in China's existing Russian 
pipelines through which Russia will provide China with 68 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
annually (Shoichi,2010:2). 
A great event for the bilateral cooperation is the opening of the pipeline China - Central 
Asia in December 2009. The pipeline pumps gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan to China (Shoichi, 2010: 2)18, i.e. it is 1833 km long and extends up to the end of the 
western Chinese province of Xinjiang (James, 2011: 14). 
As a result, Russia has to complete for Central Asian gas and will probably have to pay 
netback prices (in practice, European prices minus transport costs) instead of the reduced import 
rates it paid previously. Despite this, the Energy Strategy assumes that gas imports from Central 
Asia will continue and will be in total around 60 -70 billion cubic meters per year throughout the 
period up to 2030 (James,2010:26,7). 
The pipeline China - Central Asia is a project and product of the bilateral cooperation and 
affects the Sino - Russian relations. Until recently, Russia held a monopoly on the export pipelines 
in Central Asia and persistently tried to maintain that position. Besides the small pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Iran, Central Asian routes to export natural gas are completely dependent on 
Russia that owns the legacy of the Soviet infrastructure. 
Basically, the pipeline China - Central Asia interrupted the Russian monopoly over the 
routes for export of natural gas. However, although China built a pipeline and buys natural gas 
from Central Asia, it doesn’t intend to challenge Russia's energy exports from Central Asia. 
Chinese interest is only to serve its domestic energy needs. 
If we take into account the breakup of the Soviet Union and all the changes that followed 
in the political structure within the former Soviet space, conclusion can be made that the visibly 
changed economic structure is a natural and inevitable, including the area of energy. The question 
is only how much and when? Balanced power with the participation of more actors from Central 
Asia are in the interest of the Central Asian Republics (Zhao, 2010: 7).19 Nevertheless, the 
conclusion regarding this issue of Chinese - Russian relations is the follows: China and Russia 
successfully have stood the test of the energy problem regarding Central Asia. Many analysts point 
out the doubt that the Chinese - Russian competition in Central Asia energetic will lead to a 
conflict between Moscow and Beijing, however the conflict hasn’t occurred. 
Russia is increasingly seeking to develop new energetic infrastructure in the eastern 
section in order to capitalize on new market opportunities in the Asia – Pacific Ocean. The 
Energetic Strategy of Russia for the period until 2030, approved by the Russian government in 
November 2009, outlines the planned acceleration in the use of oil and gas in eastern Russia, 
aiming at exporting these products in the Asia - Pacific Ocean region (Shinji et., al.2012: 17, 
Shoichi, 2010 : 2).20 
It must be noted in light of the agreements reached during the visit of Xi Jinping, that 
forecasts predicted an increase of Russian oil supplies to China from the current 15-16 million tons 
to 50 million in the foreseeable future (Vladimir, 2013:1). The Kremlin describes China as a major 
strategic partner; likewise, the Chinese government describes the relationship as a “strategic 
partnership of coordination.” More recently, at the Sochi Olympics in February 2014, Xi 
mentioned the strong relations, describing Russia as a good neighbor, partner and friend (Nicole, 
2014:1). 
 China is the main consumer of the market from Russia in the Eastern energy strategy. 
The primary demand of China for example is projected to increase by an average annual growth 
rate of 3.3 percent in 2007 to 2030 , while that of the world is predicted to be 0.9 percent 
                                                 
18According to the agreement, Turkmenistan will provide China 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually for 30 
years, of which 13 billion produced by the Chinese company based in Turkmenistan, and the other 17 billion will be 
provided by Turkmenistan (Shoichi, 2010: 2). 
19Russia has a natural gas deal with Turkmenistan, but Russia buys gas in order to re- export. However, these sales are 
subject to many changing international market (Zhao, 2010: 7). 
20Strategy stipulates that Russia aims to increase the percentage of oil exports in the Asia - Pacific Ocean region, between 
the total oil exports, from 8 percent in 2008 to 14-15 percent in 2020-22 , and to 22-25 percent in 2030, exports of natural 
gas to grow from zero in 2008 to 16-17 percent in 2020-22 , and to 19-20 percent in 2030 (Shoichi, 2010: 2). 
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(reference scenario in the International Energetic Agency 2009 according to the World prediction 
for energy (Shoichi, 2010: 1). 
 In conclusion, a large part of the Sino-Russian partnership in energetic begins to 
become real. The possible Chinese scepticism about Russia may be caused by a hesitant attitude of 
Russia towards the cooperation in projects for oil and gas in Beijing. The cooperation with China 
in the field of energetic has the potential to become an indispensable factor in Russia's 
development plans for its Eastern regions by taking advantage of its hitherto unexploited energetic 
resources on a commercial basis. However, Russia has yet to make and use most of this 
opportunity because of its geopolitical rooted mind-set. The completion of the transnational oil 
pipeline between the two countries will be soon implemented. However, recent findings favour 
that Russia in 2014 would begin with construction of the pipeline to the two largest Asian 
economic and productive powers - China and South Korea. In addition, the Chinese partners were 
invited to participate in the development of an oil and gas project named "Sakhalin- 3"(Kira, 
2013:1). Thus, Russia and China become global and world powers and Allies, jeopardizing the 
interests of the US, which make attempts to slow down the growing economic, military and 
geopolitical power of Russia and China. 
 In the last decade positive dynamics of bilateral cooperation is observed in other areas, 
as well. A corner stone of the China–Russia relationship since the early 1990s has been military 
cooperation. Cooperation has developed in the military-political, training and military-technical 
spheres. Between 1991 and 2010, an estimated 90 per cent of China’s imported major 
conventional weapons were supplied by Russia. China remains interested in Russian military 
technology and components but has not placed a significant order since 2005.(Linda et al, 2011:6) 
 In the first few years of this century the cooperation between the two countries in the 
military technology sphere has expanded. In 2003 a "Special state programme" was developed in 
Russia covering cooperation with China in military technology. Russian-Chinese cooperation on 
military matters increased markedly in 2005. In August 2005 the first joint military exercise 
(exercise "Peace Mission 2005") was held, involving units of both armies, the purpose of which, 
according to official information, was "to develop methods of conducting anti-terrorist operations 
and dealing with inter-ethnic conflicts"(Vladimir et al,2006:8).21 
However, where as Russia was the big brother until recently in the relationship between 
Beijing and Moscow in political, economic and military might now a days this has turned around. 
Pertaining to population size, around 142,5 million Russians compare with 1.35 billion Chinese, 
China outstrips Russia nearly ten times. In 2014 China’s economy was already four times the size 
of Russia’s, and was the second largest economy in the world after the USA. Moreover, Beijing’s 
defiance budget is the second biggest in the world (the USA is number one), while Moscow’s 
accounts for the third largest. China budget revenue in 2014 is $ 1, 86 trillion - 4 times more than 
Russia $ 416.80 billion. Russia only outnumbers China in nuclear weapons; China has 250, Russia 
8500, 34 times more than China. China Military budget in 2014 is 166US$BN, 77%more than 
Russia 93.76US$BN. (http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/compare/China,Russia) 
The evaluation of the military balance of power between Russia and China is the most 
controversial part of the debate. Assurances from Russian government representatives that their 
nuclear arsenal provides a kind of security guarantee to Russia, should China change its foreign 
policy and choose expansion, suggest that Moscow fears Chinese conventional forces. In the 
opinion of the defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, China will not be able to match Russia in 
terms of nuclear potential(Marcin,2013:21). This new order in the relationship between Moscow 
and Beijing, in which China is no longer the junior partner, undoubtedly must have consequences 
for cooperation between both actors (Marcel, 2013:7, 8). 
Besides the interaction of the international events and meetings at the highest level, in the 
past few years Chinese - Russian social and cultural exchanges are observed as well. These 
initiatives create the basis for a good atmosphere in the Sino – Russian relations, especially in 
improving the perception of each other in both societies. 
                                                 
21From August 9-17, 2007, Chinese forces participated in an SCO anti-terrorist exercise in Russia for the first time 
(Elizabeth, 2009: 21). Sino-Russian military interactions seemed more dynamic in the 2009. The two successfully 
conducted the Peace Mission 2009 joint exercise in China’s northeastern Jilin Province in late July (Yu, 2009:3). 
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Russia and China, the two large economic powers in the world, depend upon global 
cyberspace for their economic productivity, social livelihood, and national security. Similarities in 
the Chinese and Russian approaches are that both countries are signatories to the recently proposed 
Internet Code of Conduct; both countries worry about cyber  influence on the public’s cognitive 
aspect; both countries are working on GPS systems, BeiDou in China and GLONASS in Russia; both 
countries have begun a focused development of new concept weapons as a source of asymmetrical 
counter weapons to include electromagnetic pulse, rail guns, nanotechnology development and so on. 
The American GPS system has already been used for more than 20 years. Today GPS and 
GLONASS receivers are used on a day to day basis, especially by the professional users, since the 
Russian GLONASS constellation reached again a 24-satellite constellation. BeiDou Navigation 
Satellite System has provided standard navigation and precise positioning services ability in the 
Asian-Pacific regions since November 27th, 2012. The actual BeiDou constellation consists of 14 
satellites.22 The BeiDou full constellation should be completed by 2020 and may be as soon as 
2017(Rock et al., 2014:1, 2). 
 Differences include the fact that Russia is in a “Soft power protection” mode while China is 
involved in both domestic protection and foreign exploitation for intelligence. Russia doesn’t seem to 
have as many clarifying cyber terms (water army, human flesh engine, etc.) as the Chinese and China 
seems to haven’t developed a concept to date for its military as the Russians have done with their 
“Conceptual View” document(Timothy,2012:22). 
 But if today relations should be evaluated, it would be more than certain that they are not 
superior to those in the past. For example, the sense of camaraderie and friendship between the 
Chinese and Russian people is currently much lower than during the 50s. Understanding within the 
national consciousness of China and Russia, also is not as positive as it was in the 50s. At that 
time, China and the Soviet Union were not only considered friendly states, but the political 
establishment and the general population were viewed as primary partners in the international 
system. 
 The present image of each other is much more complex. In both countries there are 
different opinions, including both positive and negative aspects. Some people see the other as a 
friendly country, while others base the friendship based on their own national interests. Both sides 
show an equal interest in greater cooperation. The two countries seek to nearly double trade to $ 
100 billion by 2015 and then to $ 200 billion by 2020 (Israel, 2015: 1). 
In public, the Russians say that relations are good (as the Chinese always do). But in 
private, some of them feel fear that the growing asymmetry may mean that China ceases to threat 
Russia as an equal partner in Central Asia and Pacific on energy relations or on global security 
issues. According to the scholar Bobo Lo, “Russia will become increasingly peripheral to Chinese 
interests, a marginalisation it will resent strongly”.23(Charles, 2012:110).  
In the second decade of the XXI - century Russia and China are the two most important 
players in the multi-polar global order. Together, they dominate the soil at Euro Asia. These two 
neighbors could enjoy very close economic and political relations, but instead they have a legacy 
of strategic rivalry, interrupted by occasional periods of cooperation. These relations are not 
always properly understood by the US. One thing remains unpredictable - whether these two 
states, one of which is the most densely populated country in the world, and the other largest 
country in the world with enormous possession of natural resources, will promote the constructive 
cooperation based on common interests? 
BRICS is a group of leading emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa – with the latter invited to join in 2010. The grouping, as such, was introduced in a 
Goldman Sachs report of 2003, asserting that by 2050 the first four states would have become the 
largest and most influential economies alongside the USA, thus breaking US hegemony 
(Marcel,2013:42).24 
                                                 
22GPS is still the system of the first choice. Nevertheless, GLONASS can  already be used in stand-alone mode. The 
BeiDou only RTK is feasible, providing cm-level accuracy in open sky environments (Xiaoguang et al, 2024:11). 
23Bobo Lo, ‘Ten things everyone should know about the Sino-Russia relationship’, CER policy brief, December 2008. 
24At the end of the 1990s, just like Russia, China also became more active in ASEAN, such as in 1997 in the so-called 
‘ASEAN+3’ format, which was comprised of talks of ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea, the three rising regional 
economic powers. China was also willing to support the region during the economic crisis at that time, so trade between 
Vol 22, No. 3;Mar 2015
323 office@multidisciplinarywulfenia.org
 The BRICS economy rose from 11percent of global GDP in 1990 to 25 percent in 2011 
and is poised to reach 40 percent by 2050. A Goldman Sachs paper shows BRICS, which overtook 
Japan in terms of GDP by 2005, will cross the US by 2015 and G7 by 2030. The rise of BRICS is 
described as “great transformation” (Bandi, 2013:4). Russia’s growth in 2012 and 2013 is 
estimated at 2 percent(Bandi, 2013:5). From an average growth of 10 percent for the last 25 years, 
China’s economic growth is expected to slip to levels of 6.5 percent, a trend that is forecast to 
prevail for a few more years(Bandi, 2013:5). BRICS projections moves up in US $ - Denominated 
GDP Ranking to 2050 that China will become before the US or in the first place, then India, Brazil 
and Russia on the 5th place (Bandi, 2013 : 9). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 What kind of relations would be expected in the future between the two countries and 
which would be the implications of the US policy and position, taking recent developments and 
current events into consideration?Perhaps the relations between them are promoted only on issues 
of global and regional policy and security, which have similar interests and common approaches. 
This refers to the events in Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.(Rudy et al, 2014: 99). 
   A more multipolar world order where China and Russia had greater influence would 
raise their status and better protect states that raise the ire of the West but where China and/or 
Russia have important interests, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. In March 2014, Russia used 
its veto in the UNSC to defeat a draft resolution condemning the referendum by which residents of 
Crimea voted to join Russia(Paul, 2014:48). 
The Ukraine crisis, too, works in favor of a deepening Sino-Russian gas relationship. As 
a result of Russia’s standoff with the West, Russia may be more willing to compromise on the gas 
price, with China boosting its leverage. Although China has not explicitly taken Russia’s side, 
Russian’s annexation of Crimea has already been playing into China’s hands. While Putin remains 
distracted in Ukraine, China can use this moment to cement influence in Central Asia 
(Morena,2014:4). 
   The most dangerous threat for the global security comes from the radical Islamist 
regime in Iran inclined towards nuclear weapons development. Russia and China abstained in 
terms of policy towards the Tehran policy in this, unlike the expressed US support for Israel's 
position regarding an armed clash with the Iranian regime. The development of the Iranian nuclear 
program could lead to proliferation among other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and Egypt. Threat of a high degree is North Korea. 
As for Afghanistan, especially now after the withdrawal of the US in the next two years, 
the power in the region will be rearranged. By reducing the influence of the US in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Russia and China will improve the economic ties and secure the southern border from 
the spread of Islamic radicalism. Cooperation could be encouraged especially between China and 
Afghanistan through the purchase of rare materials and oil exploration in the mineral-rich 
Afghanistan. Russia has also taken major initiatives around Pakistan, especially recovery of the 
still industry. 
Regarding the crisis in Syria (the attempt to overthrow the Assad regime) Russia and 
China had the same attitude as opposed to the West, which is in favor of change of the regime 
(SAMIR et al, 2013: 10). China and Russia are against foreign intervention in the Syrian unrest. 
Both countries share the same view of the situation in the Middle East, based on their national 
interests and the dynamics of international politics. It is a result of the view that neither China nor 
Russia wants Syria to become a second Libya. 
 Today, the world order has its roots in the Cold War, faced with profound changes in 
the powers of the leading countries. During the Cold War, as well as today, the conclusion is still 
valid that global power has never represented omnipotence that no single country has managed to 
be of power in the economic and military terms. Certainly, after the collapse of the USSR, the 
balance of power in the world has changed in favour of the US. They were the most complete 
                                                                                                                                     
China and its southern neighbors increased. China also started to show more interest in taking a leading role in diplomacy 
in Asia–Pacific.(Haas,2013:41) 
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power, but in this competition for dominance appeared a new one. China. China is developing as a 
super power, primarily in the economic sense. Today, the world lives in a multidimensionality 
which, when we analysed we can conclude that the world is multipolar. 
 However, the current positive interaction is likely to continue into the future. Moscow 
and Beijing have similar security concerns in Central Asia. Overall, mutual dependence requiring 
cooperation is a vital aspect of the current relationship, outbalancing the tensions.   
   The two powers are likely to continue to focus on friendly relations in the future, both ensuring 
mutual economic benefits and utilizing the power of each other to balance the US in global matters 
and in Central Asia. 
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